

Modern enterprise and federal networks increasingly face challenges related to identifying and validating the hardware operating within their environments. While teams typically expect enterprise-grade devices from approved vendors, the broader hardware ecosystem often introduces components and equipment that do not originate from the organization’s procurement process.
The Forward Networks tutorial highlights a key contributor: commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) consumer devices such as home routers, wireless access points, or embedded network interface components. These devices are common in home and small-office environments, but they may unintentionally surface inside larger enterprise or government networks. Because they often lack the same oversight and lifecycle controls as approved hardware, these devices create gaps in visibility and governance.
This becomes especially important in federal or high-assurance environments, where hardware provenance, vendor approval, and supply-chain integrity are core security requirements. Recent national-level assessments have emphasized the risk associated with certain consumer-grade or foreign-manufactured network devices, especially when they are used within sensitive or regulated networks.
The tutorial outlines several reasons this matters:
Because these risks directly relate to CISA supply-chain guidance and the OMB M-22-09 Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) implementation framework, organizations need a systematic way to locate and categorize devices originating from specific vendors of concern. Forward Networks developed such an approach using its Network Query Engine (NQE).
The source tutorial introduces a vendor-visibility method grounded in one of the most reliable identifiers in networking: the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI).
Every network interface card (NIC) includes a MAC address. The first 24 bits of this address—its OUI—are assigned by the IEEE to a specific hardware manufacturer. By analyzing these OUIs, network teams can determine the registered vendor associated with any NIC.
Forward Networks automates this identification by using NQE. The tutorial provides an example NQE script that demonstrates the detection workflow. While the blog does not restate code, it is important to summarize the conceptual steps and the value this approach creates.
This provides a rapid, repeatable, and automated way to surface devices manufactured by vendors of concern.
The tutorial emphasizes that this method creates a data-driven, standardized, and repeatable process for locating unapproved or unmanaged devices—critical for supply-chain oversight and Zero Trust compliance.
While a one-time scan can reveal unexpected hardware, ongoing compliance requires recurring validation. The source material explains that Forward Networks enables this through integration with Verify and Scorecards, turning OUI-based detection into a continuous monitoring capability.
Once users validate the query, they can:
This allows the detection script to run automatically using each new Forward Enterprise snapshot. Because snapshots provide historical and current network state, the check remains current without requiring manual re-execution.
Scorecards aggregate checks and provide visibility across multiple compliance or Zero Trust objectives. The OUI detection logic can serve as a foundational KPI for supply-chain assurance.
With every update, Forward Enterprise re-runs the OUI logic, revealing:
The tutorial emphasizes that this process transforms what might otherwise be a one-time audit into ongoing oversight, aligned to CISA guidance and Zero Trust mandates.
The continuous monitoring framework helps teams:
Each of these is directly described in your provided text.
The key takeaway is that Forward Enterprise’s normalized data and NQE-driven automation create a scalable model for repeatable validation. This is especially important in federal or high-assurance environments where device origin, vendor alignment, and supply-chain posture must be continuously verified.
Your source text explains that because the method relies on standardized OUIs, it can be extended far beyond identifying specific restricted vendors. The same detection workflow can be customized to fit each organization’s policies and compliance requirements.
According to the tutorial, Forward Networks engineers have expanded the framework to identify:
The original purpose includes locating Huawei, ZTE, TP-Link, or any vendor prohibited by federal procurement rules or internal security policy.
By validating serial numbers (when combined with additional checks), teams can surface hardware that does not match authorized ranges, a serious supply-chain concern.
Organizations can build NQE queries that surface devices no longer supported by the vendor, allowing for earlier planning and remediation.
Outdated or unverified firmware is a critical risk area in regulated environments. The tutorial states that these checks can be combined to support more comprehensive validation.
Teams can tailor the vendor list, whether to include specific manufacturers, product lines, or enforcement criteria. This flexibility creates a supply-chain assurance framework that can scale with expanding Zero Trust and CISA requirements.
The author also notes that adjusting the vendor list can support highly targeted checks. What begins as a simple OUI-based query for one unapproved vendor becomes the foundation for a comprehensive device-visibility strategy across complex networks.